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based on formal agreements and diplomatic relations. Former foes commonly assume that a resumption of war in the short run is unlikely. However, it remains subject to the parties' calculations and is reflected in the deployment of international border forces, contingency plans, military doctrine, war planning, training and deployment of weapons. Kacowitz et al.
underline that cold peace does not involve use of force as a foreign policy tool, not even for signalling or show-of-force purposes. Rather, the focus is diplomacy aimed at conflict reduction, negotiation and crisis-prevention. This excellent study also emphasizes the tenuousness of cold peace; it lacks cooperative institutions, confidence building measures and cooperation over non-security issues. Relations are almost exclusively at intergovernmental level and characterized by suspicion and uncertainty between former foes; cooperation does not extend to non-state actors. In addition, its social context does not reflect the shift from conflict to peace. Thus, historical narratives, media coverage, symbols, e.g., charters and flags, that shaped the former period of conflict, remain unchanged.
8
Regional factors further weaken cold peace; regional conflicts may have been mitigated but are not resolved and belligerent groups opposed to cold peace could resurge in one or more states in the region and push for a renewal of hostilities or even war. 9 Consequently, as Bull's work anticipated, the special responsibilities of the great powers are significant for upholding cold peace and promoting international order, peace and stability. 10 Miller 11 draws on collective goods theory, arguing that cold peace requires a global hegemon with clear advantages relative to other powers, and an intrinsic interest in producing the common good of peace and stability. 12 Intrinsic interest refers to the material resources in the region and the potential security threats posed by certain regional actors. Stein and Tuval demonstrate that the great powers can exert influence by providing material support, mediation among the parties, moderate pressure on allies, deterring potential peace spoilers and reassurance to its supporters. 13 A hegemon, thus, enables a strategic environment that, for security and economic reasons, makes it profitable to reinforce peace-oriented foreign policy stances and costly to resist them.
14 Gradually, cold peace can develop into more robust types of peace. Deutsch and Kupchan employ realism to highlight the use of statecraft in this process. They emphasize that, provided the country in question has a stable regime-which we argue was the perception of Constructivist scholarship 16 examines the role of social context in the evolution from cold peace to more robust types of peace. They highlight as a major achievement, the transformation in foreign policy-makers' perceptions of the relationship with a former foe, from belligerence to peace based. This 'strategic learning' process required some redefinition of the parties' national interests since maintaining mutual peace was crucial for common understanding of security, increased trade and societal integration. Consequently, the parties had to commit to political settlement and the new status quo; acceptance developed into satisfaction with peace, manifested in the declarations and actions of the ruling and oppositional elites, interest groups and the general public. Trust and respect among the parties evolved and reinforced the predictability and confidence underpinning peace. The confluence of these perceptual changes produced a common normative framework that informed the perceptions and actions of the states involved in routine interactions. Though highly significant, these constructivist dynamics took effect only after statecraft was harnessed to promotion of mutually reinforcing strategic interests.
Despite drawing almost exclusively on the experience of rich western democratic states, Liberal perspectives 17 on shifts in peaceful foreign policy stances are also pertinent. They highlight the role played by supranational institutions in fostering cooperation, opening communication channels and deepening the economic ties employed to establish a common balance of prosperity rather than power, threat or terror. 18 In this context, cooperation extends beyond the realm of security, which may lead to societal integration via travel, 16 We draw on: Kacowicz et al., 31; Boulding, Stable Peace, Kupchan, How Enemies, p. 24. 17 E.g. Boulding, Stable Peace, 63; Deutsch, Political Community, pp. 5, Kacowicz et al., Stable Peace, p. 14, 28; Bruce Russet, and 21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59 22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59 became one of the key Arab states supporting post-cold war US policy in the Middle East, and the US became the main international guarantor of the feeble Egyptian economy and its security needs. This qualitative shift in US-Egyptian relationships was linked inextricably with Egypt's pursuit of a foreign policy towards Israel, based on a more robust type of peace, which ensured US commitment to supporting Egypt's financial and security needs, and vice versa. In this respect, the US role of a superpower sustaining and rewarding Egypt's peaceful foreign policy stance towards Israel, was more forceful than its role during cold peace. Rather than being geared only towards conflict reduction, it promoted mutually reinforcing strategic interests. However, Egypt's peaceful foreign policy stance fell short of rapprochement, which would not require the support of a great power.
Concurrently, a more significant shift in the determinants of Egypt's foreign policy towards 
Consolidating Foreign Policy Change
In demonstrating that new elements in Egyptian foreign policy were irreconcilable with a cold peace thesis, the previous section challenged the conventional wisdom that Egyptian foreign policy towards Israel during the 1990s remained a cold peace policy. The post 2000
period provides an excellent opportunity to test this claim further. Following the logic of the cold peace thesis, the collapse of the peace process and the eruption of the second Intifada would have led to the cold peace elements in Egyptian foreign policy overriding the new elements that emerged in the 1990s. This section challenges this assumption, and shows that the reverse obtained. We exploit our analytical framework to demonstrate how and why the factors that initiated the change in Egyptian foreign policy in the early 1990s away from cold peace, combined to consolidate the shift from cold peace to a more robust peaceful foreign policy stance towards Israel.
As in the previous sections we begin our analysis by account for the role of great powers in 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59 sector, or 27% of industrial production and 25% of manufacturing employment in Egypt. The industry generated $558.3 million in exports-just over 10% of non-oil exports. 98 The potential blow to the textile industry would have been not just economic but also would have had strategic implications for the Mubarak regime.
In this context, the process leading to the signing of the QIZ, and its completion, is pertinent to our discussion in several ways. First, the impetus for the agreement came from two leading
Egyptian textile tycoons -Jalal-Al-Zorba and Dr Ala Arafa. The signing of the QIZ was not the only cement in Egyptian-Israeli relations and the shift away from cold peace. Since the early 2000s, Egyptian and Israeli businessmen had been negotiating the direct supply of gas between Egypt and Israel. In 2005, the Egyptian energy consortium, EMG, which had liaised with Israeli gas consumers, signed a commercial treaty with the Israel Electric Company (IEF). 104 It obliged EMG to supply some 25 billion cubic metres of gas over 15 years at an annual rate of 1.7 billion cubic metres. 105 The deal was expected to generate $2.5 billion. 106 On 1 May 2008, supply of natural gas to Israel began, although not at the volume stipulated in the agreement. Egypt's political opposition contested the agreement, arguing it was unconstitutional because it had not been approved by the Egyptian parliament. However, its legal challenge to implementation failed. 107 In August 2009, the IEF signed an updated agreement with EMG, which mandated a higher price for the gas provided and was in line with the rise in global energy prices. 108 Gas supplies continued until the ousting of President Mubarak in January 2011.
Consolidation of the gas deal between IEF and EMG further disproves the cold peace theory.
In contrast to what a cold peace foreign policy would allow, the gas deal was a commercial, The first element we explore is the role of the superpower. Drawing on our analysis of the role of the US, we would argue that the superpower's role in strategic peace was significant for producing an economic environment that, for security and financial reasons, made reinforcement of a peaceful foreign policy profitable and its resistance costly. However, the influence of the great powers in strategic peace and cold peace differs. Material support in strategic peace is not merely geared towards reducing conflict, but even more towards promoting mutual politico-military and economic strategic interests. Thus, it is more forceful 21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59 The role of statecraft is the next feature we examine. The case of Egypt's foreign policy towards Israel demonstrates that strategic peace is grounded in formal agreements that entail use only of non-violent foreign policy tools. Unlike cold peace, cooperation between states is not confined to the intergovernmental level or aimed only at conflict reduction; it includes cooperation between governmental and non-governmental business and intellectual elites, generating social interaction through the pursuit of mutually reinforcing political, military and economic strategic interests. Arguably, routine activity, over a long period of time, to promote mutually reinforcing strategic interests, creates ties that bind officials, politicians and elites outside of government, generating trust, respect, routine information flow and predictability. Thus, in contrast to cold peace, in strategic peace -although regional conflicts may persist -the probability of war is so small as not to enter the calculations of the involved parties. This consequence of strategic peace is significant in a context of limited liberal and constructivist resources to develop cooperation compared to those entailed by rapprochement, which is regulated by: common rules, norms, transparency and trust generated by supranational institutions, full societal integration via economic ties and social interactions such as travel, cultural exchanges, etc.. Similarly, the social contexts of strategic peace, cold peace and rapprochement are different.
Unlike rapprochement, strategic peace generates neither new narratives nor popular cultural symbols that subsequently promote erosion of self and other, nor does it create full societal integration. However, the social context of strategic peace is not static as in cold peace. This 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59 32 partial yet significant difference is generated by the process of strategic learning that political elites go through, ideas disseminated by intellectuals who articulate the salience of peace as reinforcing the strategic interests of the countries involved, and the commercial ties among elites.
Conclusion
The relationship between theory and case studies should be perceived as a dialogue. From this perspective, it is worth reflecting on the degree to which, according to the data in this article, the notion of strategic peace has been used to refute current perceptions of Egyptian foreign policy towards Israel. In this context, we demonstrated that the conventional wisdom that Egypt employed a cold peace foreign policy towards Israel throughout the period under Mubarak is mistaken and deeply flawed. Rather, Egyptian foreign policy towards Israel was dynamic -comprising cold peace (1981) (1982) (1983) (1984) (1985) (1986) (1987) (1988) (1989) (1990) (1991) , a hybrid foreign policy of cold peace and strategic peace (1991) (1992) (1993) (1994) (1995) (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) , and a pure strategic peace posture (2003) (2004) (2005) (2006) (2007) (2008) (2009) (2010) (2011) . Crucially, as we have shown, competing conceptions, such as rapprochement, security communities and unions, could not have captured the shift in the causes and consequences entailed by the changes we have identified in Egyptian foreign policy towards Israel.
Therefore, through the prism of strategic peace this article casts new light on an underresearched aspect of foreign policy which is at the heart of the international security of the Middle East. First, the role of the US, from the 1990s onwards, went far beyond what could be expected within a cold peace paradigm of involvement geared towards conflict reduction. 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59 Third, from the 1990s, the social context of Egyptian foreign policy did not resemble a cold peace context. The work of a small yet significant group of intellectuals, over more than two decades, set Egypt's increasing strategic cooperation with Israel according to an ideational template. Concurrently, from the early 1990s, economic cooperation progressed in a number of areas (agriculture, textiles, gas exports) deemed by the Mubarak regime to be strategically significant. While the intellectual discourse backing peace, and the level of economic cooperation, fell short of what was required for rapprochement, they constituted a degree of societal integration between parts of the Israeli and Egyptian elites that cannot be explained in cold peace foreign policy terms. Fourth, the notion of strategic peace helps us to understand how the shift from cold peace to strategic peace rendered the propensity to revert to war so small that it did not enter Egyptian or Israeli calculations. The notion of strategic peace also constitutes a critique of liberal and constructivist accounts of how and why shifts across the peace spectrum occur. It emphasizes that the realist dynamics brought by the impact of great powers and bi-lateral foreign policy cooperation, and the social relations they engender within elites, are the main motivation for a shift from a cold peace foreign policy to a more robust peace-oriented foreign policy. As these dynamics are set in motion, they prompt a change in the social context of foreign policy, which is evidenced by the emergence of trust, predictability and routine interaction among governmental officials, the ideas generated by intellectuals who articulate foreign policy in terms of strategic interests, and societal integration among elites. That said, the social context never transcended the contours of strategic peace, which was strongly reflected in Mubarak's insistence not to visit Israel throughout his presidency. 
